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We've thought a lot about what to say today and some of the discussions 
that need to be covered. We see this group as terribly important to what 
ultimately is determined to be both private and state policy for the State of 
Florida. We also believe, as in business, that if we don't happen to select 
the right solution, we may not have the time to do it right -� if the 
pressures are great enough -- but we will find the time to do it over. The 
thing about choosing the wrong solution is that the problem will still be 
there and we'll have the fun of readjusting it. 
So I'm trying to be very clinkal and philosophical about this whole 
thing and say it's better to get along and be able to communicate and work 
with people, than it is necessarily to be totally candid and say what you 
really think. And then you think about it a little bit longer and you realize· 
that, at your. age, you're going to be around to do it over, if it has to be 
done over, and so you come back in favor of the more candid approach. What I 
am going to say will probably alienate all the interests in the room at one 
point in the talk. So at least there will be some equity. 
Let me just begin with a few personal and hopefully light-hearted 
comments before I get into the body of the talk. I think it's a little ironic 
and somewhat humorous that Blue Cross and Blue Shield which has been opposing 
formal rate-setting, but favoring the Cost Containment Board's revjew and 
disclosure activity, should be seen as somehow rather in the pocket of or 
controlled by providers or trying to protect its own hidden self interests 
such as one new one I've heard about that you really have a discount, but no 
one else knows it and somehow or other that will come out, which, of course, 
is false. But that because somehow or other we have this special interest, we 
oppose rate-setting. 
The reason I find that ironic is because the two states that are most 
frequently cited as models of rate-setting are Maryland and Connecticut. And, 
of course, in Maryland the hospitals aggressively pursue rate-setting as a way 
of getting more revenue out of Blue Cross. And that was not a hidden agenda, 
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that was a formal public statement .. And in Connecticut, the Connecticut Blue 
Cross never pays r1hat the rate-setting Cammi ssi on sets, but rather they 
negotiate their own rates which are almost in every case below the 
Commission's. So, from our standpoint we should be so lucky as to go to 
rate-setting and get the Maryl and discount as all party-payor systems call for 
when we can justify it economically, and quite obviously, we believe we can't. 
Number two is we are acting on behalf of our subscribers, and we want a 
sound health care system, but not necessarily a lavish one. 
Number three, we believe, more than anything else, that there is a need 
to facilitate innovation, and change the current adversarial relationship that 
exists in large measure as regulatory agencies are put on the point and told 
to so�ehow or other make things better for the public. Because they are 
forced into that posture, it is inevitable that they adopt the regulatory 
approach. 
Now, at the current time, the only rate-setting authority exists in the 
State Department of Insurance. As we have talked about earlier, to many 
people in the public, that's an equation with higher health care costs and 
higher insurance costs one and the same. And I believe this group even 
expressed that by a margin of two-thirds, one-third. Therefore, why not, if 
-you're trying to control health care costs, why not regulate or control health 
insurance costs? 
Well, the problem is, as I'll show you later on, that the insurance 
industry is not making a bunch of money off the health insurance field. And 
as you pressure them, you of course distract them. They worry about things 
like surviving, and therefore they don't worry about innovation. So if you 
really want to facilitate change in the marketplace, which is what I had 
understood this Task Force is supposed to look at -- competition and consumer 
choice -- then I think the regulatory agencies need to both facilitate 
informed buying by the cons�mers as well as facilitate the insurers, 
coalitions,· and others, meeting that consumer need, by facilitating change. 
There is a big difference between facilitation and innovation, and an 
adversarial regulatory relationship. And that's not a comment about people or 
personalities, it's a comment about the system and the way the system works 
today. I also think that we are threatened by the false hope and promise of 
going to rate-setting, which will not be self correcting; that is, if it 
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doesn I t work the next step wi 11 be, "well, you know we I ve got the rates down, 
but utilization is high, so let's get that utilization program going and 
control that. 11 A 11 th� while, the agency assigned to do the work is assigned 
the job of evaluating of its own performance. And not too many such 
organizations are overwhelmingly critical of their performance. So large 
employers in our view in Florida will be served no matter what. I think it's 
also ironic, right now, that there are some in the hospital industry here that 
are looking at rate-setting and saying "Hey, that may protect my income, my 
revenue, my position." Not realizing that, as far as I'm concerned� the horse 
is out of the barn in terms of competitive initiatives. There will be 
competition and there will be competition choices, unless severe regulatory 
pressures are brought to bear, which are probably beyond the state's capacity 
to do. And that's because of the freedom of large employers through ERISA and 
self-insurance to not worry about what the state agencies say or do. If they 
can, and properly so, negotiate better deals to meet their responsibilities to 
their employees and themselves, they're going do it and they are going to be 
the driving force for change. 
It's kind of hard to view it this way, but I see from my early days of 
being an economic analyst, I see a tremendous parallel between the hospital 
industry and the cost of energy. And for awhile there was pain with the cost 
of gasoline and then there was an agreement that I really didn't need to drive 
that gas hog. But I loved it for a very long time before I decided I didn't 
need it. And the thing that changed my mind was the price of the gas not the 
regulation which, caused me almost not to have any. 
I believe in this case, that large employers, and I've talked to a large 
number of them, and as a matter of fact I was with a half a dozen of them for 
several days recently, that they are preoccupied with the need to get relief. 
And they're going to get relief. And a lot of the things that are very 
attractive to us, such as cancelling coverage for dependents, which is a very 
strong force in the market by the way, individuals because Florida is so much 
as I'll get into later, employers pay for the employees not their dependents. 
Families are cancelling coverage for their dependents. The only trouble is 
when mom is in the hospital and father has to go to work, he goes to his 
employer and says, "Do you have a few hundred?" because in order for him to 
stay employed and keep his family group together, he needs relief, he needs 
help, and he frequently turns to the e�ployer. 
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So some of the programs that ca 11 for II large sacrifi ce 11 from subscribers 
and employees, number one, do not recognize the sacrifice they're already 
making out of their own pocket, and number two, do not recognize the role 
large employers are going to play in breaking that issue open. 
Those are some of the summary and early comments that I wanted to make. 
What I like to do now would be to summarize the Plan's position on dealing 
with the cost problem. Beyond what I said in an introductory sense, change is 
occurring in a very profound way. Some further just very brief introductory 
comments are that Medicare has changed. For us to fail to recognize DRG 
reimbursement in private or government program planning for the 80 1 s, I think 
would be insane. And I still hear talk about mechanisms of rate-se_tting, 
including all of the work done by the Cost Containment Board, which does not 
recognize DRGs. So there is a very practical, technical question about 51% of 
the admissions and days in Florida being Medicare admissions and days, how can 
you talk about either innovating in the private sector or in the government 
sector without also talking about dealing with the changes that are coming 
through the DRG form of reimbursement? Secondly, there will be, at the 
margin, changes made in large employer plans and other prograQS. So one of 
our questions is, do we want to leverage the change that's already in the 
system and work with it, or do we want to go a different way? 
Our view is that what is needed are widely available competitive 
suppliers, in both delivery and financing alternatives, in a competitive and 
unregulated environment. Not only are the things such as DRGs changing, but 
the number of physicians in the community is changing dramatically. 
Nationwide there is a tremendous increase, and in the southeast there is even 
a sharper increase. 
We believe that competition is the only viable form that will ensure 
innovation in health care delivery and financing and create incentives that 
will lead to efficiency and productivity. 
We believe it's the state's role to promote a market or business climate 
that promotes the above. Regulation is a barrier to its achievement, that is, 
of innovation. It stifles and restricts it. If you're worried about whether 
you're going to survive, be it insurer or hospital, you try to deal with that 
issue first and then after that, to the degree you have resources available, 
you work on other issues. What is needed is a cooperative approach. 
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I believe that it is an inevitable result, with the current frustration 
over health care costs,_that if you create a situation where-you say to a 
regulatory agency, 11 you make it better", then you create a situation where it 
must be an adversarial relationship. I might also add that from a private 
business management standpoint, it is the general feeling that if you don't 
have the support of the people working within the context of the control 
system, they find a way to beat it. 
We will work on behalf of our subscribers in any environment to-make it 
as cost effective as possible. Simply stated, if the ultimate decision of the 
legislature is to go to rate regulation, we will work in that context. We 
don't think it's the right way to go, we think it will restrict the 
innovations, but we'll do the best we can under those circumstances. 
Therefore, we recommend the following: first of all from a price 
standpoint, and I'll get into the reasons behind all of this as we go along, 
deregulate providers and insurers. One of the things that people seem to be 
saying is that there is a windfall out there for the insurance industry and if 
health care costs come down they are going to capture that windfall and that's 
really terrible. Well, I'll show you some operating data a little later in 
the talk. 
But we would offer a second proposal which is that if you want to do 
something, be sure that the insurer has adequate funds to compete and pay his 
bills. And·then put through an excess profits law. If, as a matter of state 
policy, you don 1 t want any insurer making a contribution to surplus for risk 
and contingency of more than five percent, which I think is the auto insurance 
standard, then put that in, or some other standard. And say, after the fact, 
11D0 the best job you can; you're entitled to something for that effort. But 
after that point, end it. 11 And do away with all of the burden and the 
bureaucracy and the use of resources, trying to defend future events that no 
one is certain what they're going to be, and trying to make the public better 
in anticipation of that. 
Number three, establish a Governor's Commission, or extend this one, 
w�ich will do a comprehensive research study. We think there is one very 
important thing that has not been done so far. This has been essentially a 
collection of viewpoints and opinions. It  has been worked in terms of this 
group of diverse interests, working together effectively to try to process 
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that information. And I think the people and the staff should be commended 
for that. But what it has not been is a quantitative, fact-oriented analysis 
of Florida's health care delivery and financing. 
There is not assembled a set of facts that are generally accepted as the 
authoritive set of facts on the Florida situation. And when you get the 
simple questions like, "Did the insurers make a lot of money last year or 
didn't they? 11 , this commission has no informed opinion on that subject. And 
if I present data, unless people with a different point of view have a chance 
to validate that data, then they will not accept it as authoritative. 
Now the forum that I'm talking about is one that was brought up when 
Buddy McKay's commission first got started. A suggestion was made which I 
strongly endorsed, that a group like the Research Triangle Institute or some 
other formal group, engage themselves in a consulting relationship with such 
as Bell and this commission to prepare and obtain and present factual 
information. 
� I think it also is in our long-run interest to do something about the 
fact that Florida universities do not have, apparently today, proven capacity, 
nationally recognized capacity, to do that work as I understand it. Down the 
road we need that capability as one of the largest states in the union. It's 
unfortunate that I mention the University of North Carolina or some other 
group to do that kind of work. So I think that finding it in the context of a 
school of health care administration or public health or whatever would be 
important. 
We are prepared to participate in and provide significant funding to an 
effort of that kind. We understand that traditionally the problem has been on 
this subject, "Oh well, you'll get it through one part of the legislature, but 
you won't get it through the other because people aren't going to be willing 
to pay for it. 11 Well, I c�n assure you that we are prepared to make a 
significant contribution to the funding of such an effort. And I think that a 
joint private/public funding would be a very desirable event, because I think 
it would create ownership of the statistics and results and the information. 
We also would recommend an oversight committee in the legislature that 
would ensure growth of competitive alternatives. The State Insurance 
Department could adopt a facilitating role in promoting the growth and report 
annually to the committee on the growth of these various alternativ� measures. 
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Ensure that other gov�rn�ental agencies adopt a facilitating role and 
recognize that some risk taking has to occur. You can't say, "I don't want 
anyone to be hurt, but I do want innovation." They're mutually exclusive. 
And if it's not acceptable to ever have a mistake or ever have something not 
work, then you ca� assure yourself that you're going to have the status quo. 
As I will point out later, and I think we have facts on each one of these 
recommendations, that we believe there should be an elimination of mandated 
benefits to provide insurers the freedom to meet market needs. What is 
happening right now is there are two tiers to the market. There are those 
people who can get the self-insurance� I'm talking to eraployers as small as 
one hundred people who are self insuring, who are under third party 
administrators; no one in state government even knows they exist, far less, 
their having to worry about mandated benefits. I t  is, from our standpo int, 
far and away the most profound market movement of the last five years. Andi 
think earlier evidence by the South Florida Coalition on the number of their 
members who are self-insured, is a witness to that. And I believe the man 
from Ryder made an eloquent explanation of the advantages that they derive 
from being free from mandated benefits. 
The state should adopt a prudent buyer position for Medicaid and use its 
buying power to negotiate coverages for its people. Medicaid _should adopt a 
DRG-type reimbursement system, and to begin and expand experimentation with a 
variety of programs. We have, by the way, in my view, not even listed the 
experiments and the innovations that other states are trying, far less 
evaluated them. And I mention that as just one other example of why we 
believe that a Governor's Cormnission is needed or some other group is needed 
to do a comprehensive review. 
We think you should monitor regulatory and market developments and 
consider passing legislation to protect PPO and network development, similar 
to that passed by the federal government for HMO development. And that is 
something that says, " In  the interest of these programs gro'fling, in the 
interest of PPO programs growing as HMO programs were growing, to set aside 
routine regulatory pressures on them in the interest of seeing them grow and 
then evaluate their performance aft�r about a two-year period. And deal with 
problems that are observed to have occurred in their development. 11 But if you 
�-� -::·· - ·- J.l���,�:�W����:�.--
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expect people to both find the way to develop PPOs, make them cost effective, 
make them responsive to the market, and also deal with a highly complex 
regulatory system, I think it reduces the chance of success. 
Now those are the recommendations that are the result of a lot of 
information that we are going to share with you, I hope the word isn't 
"punish" you. But basically what we've felt we need to do is describe the 
essential nature of the health care problem in Florida, to outline market 
characteristics and the results of both the regulatory and competitive models, 
to assess some of the distinctive Florida enviornmental factors, to 
demonstrate that regulation is currently hurting the health insurers by 
preventing them from innovating to meet market needs. And as I said earlier, 
but Lester was out of the room, this is a system comment, not an observation 
about people. It's an observation about public policy and the dynamics of 
that policy. And to recommend specific marketplaci solutions which the public 
and private sectors could implement to contain health care costs. 
This is the problem statement that we agreed to some time back. Costs 
are too high and are out of control and unacceptable. We would like to share 
with you a few slides from some studies we've done. Corporate opinion 
survey: Which of the following can do the most to keep down the cost of 
health and medical care? (That "government" not necessarily being the state, 
but all forms of government. ) Which of these has contributed most to rising 
health care and medical costs? Hopitals 47%, doctors 46%, insurers 28%, 
government programs 20%, improved care 11%, and individuals 10%. -So 
politically, what should be done is really sort of clear. The government, 
which is seen as most powerful in that first slide, and the hospital which is 
seen as most responsible by a little bit, the second slide, should go together 
and we would regulate. 
Now as far as it being out of control and being a serious problem, I 
would like.to show you a slide on our own corporate data on our rate 
increases. One of the things that troubles us at every meeting, is when 
people talk about the rising cost of health care, what indicator to use? As 
an insurer, I care about what people pay for health care in total. I don't 
care about just per diem rates or adjusted cost per admission, or some other 
factor. Because as we talked about at our last meeting, there are a lot of 
ways of squeezing the balloon. If you squeeze one part of i� and it pops out 
in higher utilization, you haven't saved money. 
-8-
Now this is a combination of two factors. This thirty plus percent 
increase for three years, is coming down a little bit, reflects revenu�s of 
hospitals going up about 22% a year, plus the utilization in other services, 
plus to some degree healthy people dropping insurance and getting out of the 
market. That is, we see a general adverse selection occurring, as people drop 
coverages, particularly small groups and individuals. Dropping coverage as 
they make judgments that at the current premium, it's not worth the price. 
The reason we say it's out of control is the inevitable result of that is down 
the road there is a collapse in the marketplace and thus the availability of  
coverage in terms of responsible coverage, meaning so�e reasonable amount of  
the premiums going for claims, we think that that is threatened by this 
continued trend. 
We have two other charts on consumer price index and the only point I 
would make about this is that dramatic as they are, they all understate the 
problem of health care costs. They don't overstate it, they understate it. 
When charges went up 12%, revenues are going up 22%, they generally accept a 
trend factor in the health insurance industry today of 25% for the cost of 
·health insurance coverage. 
will increase 25% each year. 
that problem is all about. 
That means claims filed by one person for one year 
So none of these indicators adequately set what 
Let's take a look at some admission data. Admissions per 1, 000 
population, national and Florida data, and I believe this is age adjusted, but 
I'm not certain. They are remarkably similar, both the national and the 
Florida data. Total expense per adjusted admission Florida (age adjusted) is 
below the rate-setting states, which tend to be in the higher cost areas of 
the northeast, and all states and the District of Columbia by a little bit. 
Let's look at some of the causes behind the rate of increase in hospital 
costs. General inflation as it factors into (this is from the Health Care 
Financing Review) technology, population growth, and increased utilization 
rates. One of the issues, of course, that we're mindful of in terms of this 
group is, if we do set rates, will we simply reduce number of services, which 
is rationing, or increase efficiency? Looking at some of these causes, of 
course, helps us try to sort that out. 
If  you. look at Medicare and Medicaid, they're using a pro-competition 
model, in the sense that they're setting a price irrespective of costs. Most 
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of the rate-setting commissions begin with saying, "We'll look at your costs 
and if they're reasonable we'll allow them to pass through; and if they're 
not, we'll do some kind of detailed review." That does not necessarily have 
an incentive for efficiency in it. In the case of states like Michigan and 
California, lookipg at the Medicaid question, they are looking at a variety of 
ways of achieving pressure on the provider to be more efficient. If you can 
bid for the right to serve Medicaid patients and you get that service on a 
capitation basis, meaning you're paid for the patient per month, and you 
satisfy them, you get more patients. And if you don't satisfy them, you get 
fewer patients. 
The question that is before us, really, is how to leverage these Medicare 
and Medicaid ·decisions into the total cost equation? Because they're nearly 
two-thirds of the spending for hospital costs for care in Florida. I think 
it's 51% plus 7%, if I remember correctly, for Medicare and Medicaid, 
respectively. The problem with price regulation is that if you look at the 
United States, look at New York and the other rate-setting states, New York 
shows clear signs of capital deterioration by the hospitals. The key is, what 
can be done to improve the efficiency of the system? And we believe that that 
lies in creating incentives fbr efficiency. 
We think that the experience of the Hospital Cost Containment Board shows 
that the fnevitable result of that work is hospitals hiring professional 
staffs to both analyze and present their case most effectively, and for the 
most simple of all reasons, that ultimately their survival depends on it. 
They also will hire expensive legislative representatives and other 
-representatives to see to it that their interests are met as they try to work 
themselves through a series of "policy clarifications. 11 That is, as you get 
rate-setting up, you can never give it the support of well thought out policy 
on how to deal with special situations. And so those will get hammered out 
over time. If they're hammered out favorably to the hospital industry's 
viewpoint, costs will go up. If they're not, then the status quo will tend to 
be supported. 
We don't see at the present time, and we'll show you some data from 
rate-setting states, that there is a. compelling justification to rush into 
regulation. At the same time we think that the problem is clearly 
unacceptable the way it is. We think that there is a window of opportunity to 
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develop innovative programs that would involve consumers, hospitals, 
· physicians, insurers, other third-party administrators, and alternative 
delivery and financing systems. We think that that group is out there wanting 
to do something. And the role of state governQent can either facilitate those 
changes or can slow it up. 
We've had a lot of discussion and Buddy McKay brought in Walter McClure 
to talk about the market failure in the economy and in the health care portion 
of the economy more precisely. We've talked about what is needed for 
successful market mechanisms, and one part of it is informed consumers with 
options to buy, and the other is price as the mechanism for allocating the 
goods and services among the consumers. What's been the problem so far, 
except for HMOs, is that price has not been the mechanism. If  you read the 
hospital literature and you talk to the man who is now a marketing director of 
a hospital, he's talking about his two markets: physicians and patients. He 
wants to market to both of them, and that 1 s his conflict, ·with the notion of 
price competition, given today 1 s market mechanisms. In  the case of the HMO, 
it has been proved to work in a sense that the individual puts the total 
package together of his system of benefits, buys it essentially for a one-year 
period. At the end of that one year, he makes a decision whether or not he 
wants to continue. And that's something he can get his hands around, and 
understand, and deal with, and make an informed judgment. 
The variety of anxieties about whether you I re going to be ill, the 
variety of availability of services among hospitals and physicians_, the 
different health conditions of the patients, their ages, their circumstances, 
all make it impossible to simply compete on the basis of price per unit of 
service, where service is a laboratory test or a physician visit or a trip to 
the hospital. It simply has not worked; it has not occurred. 
I think that the belief is today that the HMO has acted in its own right 
to generate a market segment; but also to educate the public, both consumers 
and wholesale buyers -- namely employers -- that there are some other 
options. I t  is really out of both the success and the failure of HMOs that 
these PPOs have gotten to be developed. Because they allow price competiton, 
but you don't buy an entire delivery system. 
We think this is the beginning of reform in the health care industry from 
the standpoint of marketplace forces, because it brings in price. If you 
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don't have price competition, it is very hard to argue against rate 
regulation. I don't think there is anything in between. You've got to have 
one or the other. And you've got to have enough price competition that it 
changes people's behavior. And that's got to be evident. 
And .I think we need all the help we can get in doing it, and I think the 
state has two very powerful roles as the operator of the Medicaid program and 
as an operator of the largest employer-employee program in the state. And 
those two roles, using those two points of leverage, I think they could make a 
profound impact on the financing and delivery, by impacting on the 
marketplace. They're already doing that by an active, supportive role for HMO 
development, but I think that needs to extend to PPO development and other 
forms of coverage, and I've already said, on the Medicaid side as well. 
To have the decision maker for services free from the awareness of price, 
largely having the decision made by a provider, simply is an apt description 
of market failure. The choice, therefore, is between complete regulation and 
active, aggressive work to improve the competitive marketplace. It is not a 
choice of the status quo. 
We've created a little visual that shows the strategies for health care 
cost containment. There are people who are far more knowledgeable than I in 
this audience who work the Washington scene. But as I basically understand 
it, the reason that we are moving to voucher systems for ·Medicare, the reason 
we are moving to DRG reimbursement, is because for Medicare these various 
forms have been considered to have faiied. 
It was not very hard in '73 and '74 to go to Washington and find people 
who advocated regulation as the solution to the problem of rising Medicare 
costs. But there are very few people today who believe that the regulation of 
the last number of years has worked. And I find that especially interesting 
because at the state level if you find under rate-setting that in fact you 
have not controlled total cbsts, then you're forced to go, having already gone 
to certificate of need, which I also will tell you didn't work (even though 
people love it who worked at it and I was one of them) . You go from 
certificate of need, you go to controlling hospital rates, you've only got one 
thing left, you've got to control hospital utilization. You're going to have 
to have a state agency to do it. And to say that you can get by with less 
than that, I think is being less than fully candid. 
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Now on the bottom half there are many things that are shown, but the 
basic issue is whether or not you negotiate, in meaningful tenns for your 
buyers. Some of the things that are needed are advertising refonn. One of 
the very popular issues, a program we have started now privately, is 
directories by municipal area, of who it is that will live within certain 
limits and those limits will be negotiated from year to year. And that makes 
the consumer able to make choices. Now if they're not in terms of how he buys 
care you have not helped him, so you better start with the physicians. 
Alternative systems, whether they are PPOs or not, all imply negotiations. 
Broader insurance offerings under certain conditions, where the provider is 
combined with the consumer in trying to contro 1 -ut i 1 i za ti on rather than the 
other way around. 
Cost per adjusted admission, six states with mandatory rate-setting, 41 
states without. Cost per adjusted patient day. I understand that if you take 
New York state off of most of these indicators, the balance of those states 
woul d be considerably higher. We are very concerned about squeezing the 
ball oon, because we think if you control one item it'll just drive the 
expenditure somewhere else. Health insurance costs will not have been 
lowered, but public expectations that they should be lower will occur. If you 
want the data I will dig it out. 
But continuing with certificate of need, we look at certificate of need 
in Florida. Our experience with it is very sifililar to that of a variety of 
programs where consumer involvement has been great. They generate tremendous 
public support. But the fact of the matter is, that the hospital bed supply 
in Fl-0rida has risen more rapidly per thousand population in Florida than the 
United States as a whole. So that we put certificate of need in, and the 
result is we have regulation and we have raore beds. And being a former member 
of a HSA board, and involved in planning, you know for many of these decisions 
that the working committee may have said no, but somewhere along the line the 
decisions have changed. 
I'd like to talk briefly if I could move to the mandated benefits 
section. The problem with mandated benefits is somebody comes into the 
legislature and says, 11 We operate more efficiently than those other guys and 
if you will just require insurers to pay us, then costs will be down because 
this is much more efficient. " The only trouble is it doen't work that way. 
They get a new source of revenue, but the other costs that were in the system 
remain there. 
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We have a few of these that we thought might share with you some of the 
h�rd data on. Alcohol and drug abuse rider. Net increase as near as we can 
determine, $3.50 a month� Now it may be socially desirable, that's the second 
question, but if you're talking about cost, you say, 11 Well, do you or don't 
you let the public decide?" 
-� 
. 
Chiropractic rider which involves tremendous selection -- out of the 
total population only a small fract{on of the people use it -- and those that 
use it, use it extremely extensively. We have one very large group where 
chiropractic services, I believe, is the second largest service that we pay 
for. And people will come in and they will say, "Well, you know you can get 
the coverage by doing these things, and then just come in once a week and 
we'll take care of you." It's not altogether unknown also when you have an 
80-20 coinsurance to say, "Don't worry about the 20%," so you've now created 
zero cost for the consumer to use his services. 
One of the more dramatic ones came from Massachusetts data on outpatient 
psychiatric care. In January of 1976 a broad out-patient psychiatric benefit 
was mandated in the state of Massachusetts. Now that is the cost of millions 
of dollars from about 7 million dollars to 45 million dollars in a small 
number of years for that benefit. Now you don't get, comQon to popular 
belief, some corresponding offset someplace else. So part of the increase in 
cost as the consumer sees it, is in mandated benefits, because they're 
essentially a creature of the 70's. 
Talking about regulation in the industry: we have quality through 
licensure and accreditation. We're talking about rate setting in Medicare. 
In Medicare we have a DRG system which essentially has incentives built into 
it. It� be beaten, and there is great concern it wil l  be beaten. That's 
the issue we have to deal with. How we would do that in a state program, I 
think it should be recognized that there would be some form of utilization 
review. I don't think you can consider one without the other. As I've 
indicated to you earlier, certificate of need has not worked especially well. 
In  my part of the state there is clearly a surplus of beds and yet there have 
recently been filed several proposals for new hospital beds in the area. 
(QUESTION: COULD YOU MAKE THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MANDATED BENEFITS AND 
MINIMUM BENEFITS?) 
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Yes. What we ' re really talking about is if somebody wanted to buy only x 
services, we I re trying to sell that ; we' re all for somebody eval.uati ng that a 
couple years later and saying, now we have some hard facts, to x, or y, or z. 
You get this sort of intuitive reasoning that's led to ever broader building 
blocks which is in my opinion clearly u ndesirabl e. 
What I like  to do is go to the underwriting results of the insurance 
industry . We have more detailed information on our own company. But this is 
published from the Argus Charts, which is a national publication for the 
commercial insurance industry which has included Blue Cross data up until 1982 
when they stopped issuing it . The data are essentially drawn from the blanks 
that are filed with the State I nsurance Department. It does not talk about 
investment income, but obviously that is a factor. But certainly, if there 
were a motivation behind people wanting to see a change in the way we do 
business, it's that slide. Clearly, the industry would not be very threatened 
by any reasonabl e upper limit on so-call ed profits, with that kind of a 
hi story to it. 
What I'd like to do no\t is hold the slides and go into a little bit of 
what we think the benefits could be if we put more incentives into the 
marketplace. First of all, we're talking about sel ective roll back of 
regulations which discourage competition and innovation. We're talking about 
using the buying power of large purchasers of health care services, such as 
third-party administrator organizations, commercial insu rers, employers, and 
government. We think the incentive should be for prudent selection of 
providers, by the individual consumers. That to us is the key. We support 
cost sharing, public informati on, and awareness. We do not believe that cost 
sharing is the answer. If it were, how do you explain the success of HMOs? 
We think today we understand that the alternatives are HMOs and PPOs, but 
five years ago nobody thought about PPOs. And I believe if you allow these 
developments to occur, there will be new forms of coverages that are not being 
thought of today, and therein lies the opportunity for real improvement. We 
also think a great deal more can be done in the area of public education • . 
We've done work on things like smoking with children in schools. I don't see 
any reason why the issue of health care costs and incentives cannot be worked 
at all levels from the general public through work of the Cost Containment 
Board and other�, down through the school systems. 
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If you look at what's happeni ng  i n  COQpetition iri other indu stries and 
try to draw a parallel between that and the health care industry, some things 
j urap out at you. The airline deregulat i on has fostered the growth of new and 
lower cost services. Some high cost operations have been hurt. Some may 
ultimately be forced to reorganize. It ' s  a harsh saying, but I think that it 
needs to be said, and that is, 11a small number o f  bankruptcies ma.y be very 
good for the hospital industry. " The fact that a hospital goes into 
bankruptcy is not necessarily bad for the community it serves. The most 
likely consequence of that is certainly new management, and a new working  
relationship with the physicians, very possi bly a new board, and a new view of 
their responsibilities and their fiduciary role . 
So the idea that somehow or other that we've got to protect this industry 
and not let it work its way throu gh, I woul d agree to that an in about 15 to 
20 percent of the hospitals that are sole providers to the state, that is, 
they're in a service area where there is no other alternative. They have an 
effective monopoly. It may be tou gh to argue, and I wouldn't argue especially 
long and hard, that rate review in that setting with some kind of a limit is 
inappropriate, because if they are monopolists, then they may have to be 
treated as such. But for the vast majority of the industry there are 
opportunities to get involved, to organize . If you look at what DRGs have 
done, for the first time hospitals are saying, 11 1 do have a stake in how that 
physician practices. " And that's beginning to mean as much to them as whether 
or not he's happy with the hospital and keeps his patients there. Because if 
he takes a lot of patients in, but the hosptial loses money, they're worse off 
than they were before. In the past the pri mary concern was basically not to 
alienate. So some of these changes are already present. 
We had put together, very briefly, based upon looking at Jacksonvi 11 e, 
where a lot of things are going on, a competition senario. We had a point in 
time where essenti ally we had a status quo. We're all competing with each 
other and we I ve got sor.1e very stong and successful cor.1pani es in J acksonvi 11 e 
and in the health insurance business, and they're very active. But gradually 
over time things have begun to change. 
As near as I can tell, from personally working with the group, the 
precipitating change is clear evi dence that HMOs are coming into the 
Jacksonville market. That in turn is believable and has caused providers to 
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think about changing, because the HMOs have grown so rapidl y in other parts of 
the state and what's happening in Orlando. And Pru-Care coming into Orlando, 
I wish it were Blue Cross Care, but it's Pru-Care, has made a fundamental 
change in how physicians and other think about their role and their 
relationships. We have reason to believe that four HMOs are going into 
Orlando in 1984. Now from that general background and that being considered 
by many the most conservative part of the state raedicall y speaking, there 
became a clear indication that there's going to be an HMO in - Jacksonvil l e. 
And then there were going to be two, and currently there are three that are in 
planning. And for a fourth one, a feasibility study is being done. Pru-Care 
has recently met with the chamber, I wasn't there, they indicated they were 
looking at it. Clearly we ' re l ooking at it. A proprietary group is in, the 
foundation is in, with a program. 
It is cl ear to everyone that the status quo is· a thing of the past. It's 
not going to l ast. Now what's going to happen? Well, a group of hospitals 
got together and decided that they better work a PPO. One large insurer 
decided it better get a PPO going. Then another group of hospital s decided if 
one group of ·hospitals was going to get a PPO goi ng, then they better get one 
going. So it now looks l ike in Jacksonvil l e  there is in the planning stage, 
something in the neighborhood o f  seven al ternative forms of coverage other 
than traditiona·1 insurance. And that has evolved essential l y  over about a 
one-year period. Now the earl y work for the HMOs was a three- to five-year 
act. One of those PPOs has announced and is actively marketing. 
We would expect in the second year, under Phase II, that there wil l be a 
second PPO in that market actively sol iciting business. 
We think that in the Third Phase, it would be about a two-year period 
we'll see instead of "Boy, am I glad to have negotiated an arrangement ! ," 
" It's a good arrangement, but I'm having a littl e problem, prices went down, 
utilization went up. 11 Let's talk some more about how we reward one another , 
how we negotiate the deal, and how we sel l it. Meanwhile the employers have 
learned, and they're buying smarter, and they're buying harder. And finally 
you get to the real effective price competition, which is  not rate-setting per 
se, that is, not price negotiation, but total cost negotiation. If they move 
people out of the hospital , even though their prices are high, they're saving 
us money. _So maybe they shoul d acquire a skil l ed nursing facil ity or a home 
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health agency. Now that won ' t show up in the price they charge, but it will 
show up in 1 ower cos ts. And the reason is that they have an ·incentive to do 
; t. 
We see this being essentially about a four-year effort, to where you 
would have widely available programs. We question that if you take into 
consideration  the prospect of litigation, the prospect of having to adapt a 
Cost Contain�ent Board program to a DRG-based program, to the shake down 
period that other states have experienced, to the possibility as in Conneticut 
that after a few years, that the legislature wil l reorganize it. You have to 
question the bet, and it is our money we're betting on behalf of our 
subscribers, that th� rate regulation will outperform what we see as the 
competitive alternatives. 
Now there are special situations, and I think that the most notable one 
is the small community. There are, I understand, some peopl e \torking on HMOs 
which will breakeven at relati vely small enrollment bases. But I'm not really 
sure how far along that is. And I think that ' s  one of the areas, that 15 to 
.20 percent of the populati on being served by the isolated hospital free from 
direct competition by another hospital, that deserves more intense 
consideration . 
Most of these are small hospitals. Most of their costs are labor costs. 
I'm not reall y sure what one would do i f  one decided that - their costs were too 
high. Now those of us who have been on the Hospital Cost Containment Board, I 
think have an overwhelming opinion that when you ' re reviewing the budget of a 
small hospital, you generally feel that they aren I t getting enough and they I re 
not getting good treatment, because they don't know enough to protect 
themselves. In the back and forth dialog where the commis sion staff asks for 
information, well, they don ' t  have that, will . this do? And they ' re not really 
sure what it will do. And I can't really say from a public policy standpoint, 
that I believe that those hospitals will make or break health care financing 
in this state. I see that as not of the highest priority, but I do see it as 
important. 
Let me just briefly summarize. We see in Medicare a system that has 
incentives to change the physicians' behavior. We see in Medicare, the 
voucher opportunity . We ' ve talked to the people in Medicare, we understand 
for example they've given notice to the Maryl and rate-setting commission, that 
-1 8-
because they believe Maryland is paying more under Medicare than they would 
have, that their continued authority to include Medicare payments in the 
system is now being questioned. We see the voucher system, for example, in 
our HMO in South Florida where we are filing for the authority to market that 
to Medicare elig{bl es. We find large trade unions interested in talking about 
tens of thousands of peop 1 e being made ava i1 ab 1 e to go into network type 
programs. But we see these kinds of changes occurring no matter what the 
legislature does on their side. 
We think in Medicaid, just to mention some things, eliminate weekend 
admissions, restrict the access to high cost hospitals for simple conditions, 
pay only for . tests ordered by physicians as opposed to allowing hqspitals to 
continue the practice of having standing orders. Assume if a hospi tal has an 
occupancy below 60%, their reimbursement should be calculated based on some 
assumptions about 60% or higher. In other words, don't pay for lack of 
occupancy. There are excessive beds. We have a system that pays people and 
removes the risks of building too soon, and building too much. Limit 
admissions for 14 days and then recertify them with medical reviews . 
These are just a small number, I don't know if that one's being done in 
this state, but these are only a small number of programs. We mentioned in 
previous discussi ons Michigan, for their Medicaid recipients , · selects a 
primary care physician who acts as a gate keeper. These combined with 
negotiations with the hospitals for the authority to serve the Medicaid 
population, we think, could have tremendous leverage on the system. 
So i n  summary we see the need to move toward a much more competitive 
marketpl ace where we're working together to try and acheive that. We don't 
see any limit on our public accountability . We don't see any so-called 
privileged position that this or that data or information or question 
shouldn't be asked. But you do have to understand, that if because of costs 
our claims costs go up, our premiums go up. We then are put in this 
adversarial role. Much like the hospitals trying to get th rough that 
rate-setting system. Everything depends on that, and you just don't do 
�nything else. 
I f  it's true that the competiti ve model is emerging in many of these 
forces, and many of these factors, then it would really be tragic to take 
something that was very popul ar in the early 70 1 s and middle 70's and 
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introduce it effectively in the middle 80 1 s. And then have to go back and 
say , 11Gee guys , we didn't have the time to do it right , but we will find the 
time to do it over. 11 We kind of think that ' s  what the issue is. We know we 
need everybody 1 s help. We're proud of the acti ve ,  agg ressive , and I might 
add , competent co_mpetition we have , but we think that  keeps us on our toes. 
And we think that would be good for the rest of the health care delivery and 
financing industry. Thank you very much. 
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